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I. INTRODUCTION 
In August 2016, the American Bar Association (ABA) approved 
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(g). Under the amendment, it 
is misconduct for an attorney to “engage in conduct that the lawyer 
knows or reasonably should know is harassment or discrimination on 
the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, 
age, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status or 
socioeconomic status in conduct related to the practice of law.”  
Comment [4] explains that: 
Conduct related to the practice of law includes representing 
clients; interacting with witnesses, coworkers, court 
personnel, lawyers and others while engaged in the practice 
of law; operating or managing a law firm or law practice; 
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and participating in bar association, business or social 
activities in connection with the practice of law. 
The model rule [wa]s just that—a model that did not apply in any 
jurisdiction.1 
In 2017, I wrote an article in the GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS 
about Model Rule 8.4(g).2  I urged the states to hesitate before adopting this 
provision.  First, I noted that the expanded scope of Rule 8.4(g)—”conduct 
related to the practice of law . . . would . . . inevitably chill speech on matters of 
public concern.”3  Second, I wrote that Rule 8.4(g) regulates conduct “with only 
the most tenuous connection to representation of clients, a lawyer’s fitness, or 
the administration of justice.”4  Third, I observed that Rule 8.4(g) “imposes an 
unlawful form of viewpoint discrimination.”5  I closed by “offering three simple 
tweaks to the comments accompanying Rule 8.4(g) that would still serve the 
drafters’ purposes, but provide stronger protection for free speech.”6 
This essay will provide a brief overview of how the states have responded to 
ABA Model Rule 8.4(g).  Part I reviews opinions from four state attorneys 
general who concluded that the rule is unconstitutional: Texas, South Carolina, 
Louisiana, and Tennessee.  Part II discusses the states that considered the rule 
with modifications.  Part III reviews the states that considered Rule 8.4(g) as 
drafted.  So far, only one state adopted the rule: Vermont.  However, the process 
is still not over, and other states are currently considering the rule. 
II. FOUR STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL CONCLUDED MODEL RULE 8.4(G) WAS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
Four state attorneys general have concluded that Model Rule 8.4(g) is 
unconstitutional.  Specifically, they found the rule violates the Freedom of 
Speech, Exercise, and Association, and also runs afoul of the Due Process 
Clause. 
A. Texas 
In December 2016, Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton issued an opinion 
titled, “Whether adoption of the American Bar Association’s Model Rule of 
Professional Conduct 8.4(g) would constitute a violation of an attorney’s 
                                                 
 1. Myles V. Link, Report to House of Delegates, Revised Resolution 109, 2016 A.B.A. SEC. 
CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 1, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative 
/professional_responsibility/final_revised_resolution_and_report_109.authcheckdam.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K2XB-T76E]. 
 2. Josh Blackman, Reply: A Pause for State Courts Considering Model Rule 8.4(g), 30 GEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 241 (2017). 
 3. Id. at 242. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
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statutory or constitutional rights.”7  In this opinion, Paxton concluded that the 
rule as drafted “raise[s] serious concerns about the constitutionality of the 
restrictions it would place on members of the State Bar and the resulting harm 
to the clients they represent.”8  Specifically, 
[g]iven the broad nature of this rule, a court could apply it to an 
attorney’s participation in a continuing legal education panel 
discussion, authoring a law review article, or informal conversations 
at a bar association event.… [F]or example, … candid dialogues about 
illegal immigration, same-sex marriage, or restrictions on bathroom 
usage will likely involve discussions about national origin, sexual 
orientation, and gender identity.  Model Rule 8.4(g) would subject 
many participants in such dialogue to discipline, and it will therefore 
suppress thoughtful and complete exchanges about these complex 
issues.9 
Paxton also observed that the rule 
could . . . be applied to restrict an attorney’s religious liberty and 
prohibit an attorney from zealously representing faith-based groups.  
For example, . . . [i]f an individual takes an action based on a sincerely-
held religious belief and is sued for doing so, an attorney may be 
unwilling to represent that client in court for fear of being accused of 
discrimination under the rule.10 
The Attorney General also concluded that Rule 8.4(g) runs afoul of the freedom 
of association, is unconstitutionally overboard, and is void for vagueness.11  
Texas has not adopted Model Rule 8.4(g). 
B. South Carolina 
South Carolina Solicitor General Robert D. Cook reached a similar conclusion 
in May 2017.12  His opinion favorably cited Paxton’s analysis concerning the 
First Amendment, and that of Professors Ronald Rotunda and Eugene Volokh.13  
Likewise, the Professional Responsibility Committee of the South Carolina Bar 
opposed the adoption of Rule 8.4(g).14  The Committee found that the rule’s 
                                                 
 7. Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. KP-0123 (Dec. 20, 2016), https://www2.texasattorneygeneral.gov/ 
opinions/opinions/51paxton/op/2016/kp0123.pdf [https://perma.cc/M248- HKGG]. 
 8. Id. at 3. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 4–6. 
 12. S.C. Att’y Gen. Op. Letter at 13 (May 1, 2017), http://www.scag.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/McCravy-J.-OS10143-FINAL-Opinion-5-1-2017-01331464xD2C78-
01336400xD2C78.pdf [https://perma.cc/ED72-3UGM]. 
 13. Id. at 5–8. 
 14. Id. at 11. 
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vagueness ran afoul of basic due process guarantees.15  The South Carolina 
Supreme Court declined to adopt the proposal.16 
C. Louisiana 
In September 2017, Louisiana Attorney General Jeff Landry also found that 
Model Rule 8.4(g) was unconstitutional.17  He found that the rule is a “content-
based regulation which has the effect of suppressing a lawyer’s conduct, actions, 
and speech in an array of areas and settings outside a lawyer’s professional 
practice.”18  Critically, it would apply to “a private interaction .  .  . at a social 
activity sponsored by a law firm or bar association.”19  The opinion concluded 
that the rule “likely . . . violates a lawyer’s freedom of speech under the First 
Amendment.”20  Moreover, the attorney general found that the law runs afoul of 
the freedom of exercise: “a lawyer who acts as a legal advisor on the board of 
their church would be engaging in professional misconduct if they participated 
in a march against same-sex marriage or taught a class at their religious 
institution against divorce (i.e., marital status).”21   Ultimately, the rule was 
somewhat unprecedented: anti-bias rules in other states were “narrower in scope 
than ABA Model Rule 8.4(g).”22  Also, the Attorney General found, “[t]here has 
been no demonstration that there is a need for” the proposed rule. 23   The 
Louisiana Bar rejected the proposal.24 
D. Tennessee 
In March 2018, the Tennessee Attorney General also found that Rule 8.4(g) 
“would violate the constitutional rights of Tennessee attorneys and conflict with 
                                                 
 15. Id. 
 16. Order, In re Proposed Amendments to Rule 8.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct (S.C. 
June 20, 2017) (No. 2017-000498), 
https://www.sccourts.org/courtOrders/displayOrder.cfm?orderNo=2017-06-20-01 (declining “to 
incorporate ABA Model Rule 8.4 within Rule 8.4, RPC, as requested by the ABA.”). 
 17. La. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 17-00114 at 9 (Sept. 8, 2017), https://perma.cc/9TWR-8GY9 
(opining that ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(g) and LSBA proposed Rule 8.4(g) 
violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution) [hereinafter La. 
Att’y Gen. Op.]. 
 18. Id. at 5. 
 19. Id. at 6. 
 20. Id. at 5. 
 21. Id. at 7. 
 22. Id. at 4. 
 23. Id. at 9. 
 24. LSBA Rules Committee Votes Not to Proceed Further with Subcommittee 
Recommendations Re: ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), LA. STATE BAR ASS’N, 
https://www.lsba.org/BarGovernance/CommitteeInfo.aspx?Committee=01fa2a5 9-9030-4a8c-
9997-32eb7978c892 [https://perma.cc/74SP-Z3TH] (last visited Oct. 12, 2019) [hereinafter LSBA 
Rules Comm. Votes No]. 
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the existing Rules of Professional Conduct.”25  He explained that the rule “would 
profoundly transform the professional regulation of Tennessee attorneys.  It 
would regulate aspects of an attorney’s life that are far removed from protecting 
clients, preventing interference with the administration of justice, ensuring 
attorneys’ fitness to practice law, or other traditional goals of professional 
regulation.”26  In particular, the rule would “chill attorneys from representing 
clients who wish to advocate positions that could be considered harassment or 
discrimination based on a protected characteristic, or at least from doing so 
zealously as required by the Rules of Professional Conduct.”27  I will discuss the 
proceedings in Tennessee infra Part III.F. 
III. STATES THAT CONSIDERED MODEL RULE 8.4(G) WITH MODIFICATIONS 
At least six states considered Model Rule 8.4(g) with certain modifications.  
These changes were designed to address possible constitutional concerns with 
the rule. 
A. Maine 
In May 2018, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court invited comments on the 
proposed amendment to Maine Rules of Professional Conduct.28  The proposed 
amendment would adopt ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) with “some modifications.”29  
For example, the proposal “omitted from the list of types of prohibited 
discrimination ‘marital status’ and ‘socioeconomic status.’”30  I commented on 
the proposal.31  I wrote: 
While the suggested “modifications” alleviate some of my concerns, 
the rule should still be rejected.  First, defining “harassment” as 
“demeaning conduct” can still sweep in a wide range of 
constitutionally protected speech.  Second, because the phrase “related 
to the practice of law” still includes “interacting with . . . coworkers,” 
                                                 
 25. Tenn. Att’y Gen. Comment Letter No. ADM2017-02244 Opposing Proposed Rule of 
Professional Conduct 8.4(g) 1 (Mar. 16, 2018), 
https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/attorneygeneral/documents/foi/rule84g/comments-3-16-
2018.pdf. 
 26. Id. at 2.  The opinion also cited my article in the Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, 
though it referred to me as “John Blackman.”  Id. at n.2. 
 27. Id. at 11. 
 28. Notice of Opportunity for Comment, ME. SUP. JUD. CT. (May 22, 2018), 
https://www.courts.maine.gov/rules_adminorders/rules/proposed/2018-5-
22/prof_conduct_notice_2018-5-22.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2019). 
 29. Proposed Amendment to the Maine Rules of Prof’l Conduct, ME. SUP. JUD. CT., 
https://www.courts.maine.gov/rules_adminorders/rules/proposed/2018-5-
22/mr_prof_conduct_proposed_amends_2018-5-22.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2019). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Letter from Josh Blackman, Assoc. Professor, S. Tex. Coll. of L. Hous., to Matthew 
Pollack, Exec. Clerk, Me. Supreme Judicial Court (May 29, 2018), 
https://courts.maine.gov/rules_adminorders/rules/proposed/2018-5-22/comments/blackman.pdf. 
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an attorney’s speech at bar functions could still give rise to 
discipline.32 
To date, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court has not yet acted on the petition. 
B. Louisiana 
The Louisiana State Bar Association requested written comments concerning 
ABA Model Rule 8.4(g).  The Subcommittee did not suggest adopting ABA 
Model Rule 8.4(g) in its entirety.  Instead, it proposed adopting the rule with 
several modifications.33  I wrote a letter in response in which I proposed several 
additional modifications.34 
First, whereas the ABA’s rule concerns “conduct related to the 
practice of law,” the recommended rule concerns “conduct in 
connection with the practice of law.”  The subcommittee noted that 
this modification “clearly limits application of the rule to conduct of a 
lawyer.”  With respect, this is a distinction without a difference.  There 
is no linguistic difference between “related to the practice of law” and 
“in connection with the practice of law.”  These phrases have the same 
meaning. 
. . . 
Second, whereas the ABA’s Model Rule prohibits “harassment or 
discrimination,” the recommended rule prohibits “discrimination 
prohibited by law.”  The former rule defines “harassment” to include 
“derogatory or demeaning verbal . . . conduct.”  This provision raises 
distinct Free Speech concerns.  As then-Judge Alito observed, there is 
no “categorical harassment exception” to the First Amendment.  The 
Subcommittee’s modification is an important one, as it omits the 
phrase “harassment . . . .”35 
In November 2017, the Rules of Professional Conduct Committee of the 
Louisiana State Bar Association declined to adopt the rule.36  Likewise, the 
Louisiana District Attorneys Association opposed the rule.37  The Louisiana 
Attorney General also concluded that the rule was unconstitutional. 38  
                                                 
 32. Id. 
 33. LSBA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT COMM., RULE 8.4 SUBCOMM. REPORT 9–11 (Mar. 24, 
2017), http://files.lsba.org/documents/News/LSBANews/RPCSubFinalReport.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 13, 2019). 
 34. Letter from Josh Blackman, Assoc. Professor, S. Tex. Coll. of L. Hous., to Richard P. 
Lemmler, Jr., Ethics Counsel, La. State Bar Ass’n (Aug. 18, 2017) (on file with author). 
 35. Id. 
 36. LSBA Rules Comm. Votes No, supra note 24. 
 37. Letter from E. Pete Adams, Exec. Dir., La. State Dist. Attorney’s Ass’n., to Dona Kay 
Renegar, President, La. State Bar Ass’n (Aug. 31, 2017), 
https://www.christianlegalsociety.org/sites/default/files/site_files/Louisiana%20DAs%20Propose
d%20New%20Disciplinary%20Rule%208.4h.pdf. 
 38. La. Att’y Gen. Op., supra note 17. 
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Ultimately, the Louisiana State Bar Association Rules of Professional Conduct 
Committee voted to not proceed with the rule. 
C. Idaho 
The Idaho State Bar Association proposed adopting ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) 
with modifications.39  In September 2018, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected the 
resolution.  Though it did not pass on the rule’s constitutionality, the Chief 
Justices explained, “[m]embers of the Court encourage the Idaho State Bar to 
revisit this matter in hopes of narrowing the rule to comport with new United 
States Supreme Court cases.”40 
D. New Hampshire 
During a June 1, 2018 hearing, the New Hampshire Supreme Court Advisory 
Committee on Rules considered three proposed rules that are very similar to 
ABA Model Rule 8.4(g).41  I submitted a letter.42  I noted that 
[e]ach of the proposed rules raise the same significant First 
Amendment issues as does the model rule.  For example, proposed 
comment 6 only protects “a lawyer’s rights of free speech . . . in a 
manner that is consistent with these Rules.”  This protection is hollow, 
because engaging in “free speech” that is not “consistent with these 
Rules” would put an attorney at risk of disciplinary.43 
In September 2018, the Committee recommended that a version of the rule 
should be adopted.44  Another hearing may be scheduled. 
E. Pennsylvania 
In October 2016, the Pennsylvania Bar Association Women in the Profession 
Commission (WIP) proposed adopting Rule 8.4(g).45  The Disciplinary Board 
of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that the rule was too broad.  It 
                                                 
 39. Letter from Roger S. Burdick, Chief Justice, Idaho Supreme Court, to Diane Minnich, 
Exec. Dir., Idaho State Bar (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.clsreligiousfreedom.org 
/sites/default/files/site_files/ISC%20Letter%20-%20IRPC%208.4(g).pdf. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Advisory Comm. on Rules, Public Hearing Notice, N.H. SUP. CT. (Apr. 3, 2018), 
https://www.courts.state.nh.us/committees/adviscommrules/Public-Hearing-Notice-0618.pdf  (last 
visited Dec. 16, 2019). 
 42. Letter from Josh Blackman, Assoc. Professor, S. Tex. Coll. of L. Hous., to Chief Justice 
Robert J. Lynn, N.H. Supreme Court (May 29, 2018), https://www.courts.state.nh.us/ 
committees/adviscommrules/dockets/2016/2016-009/2016-009-Rule-of-Prof-Conduct-8-4-05-29-
letter-from-Professor-Blackman.pdf. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Advisory Comm. on Rules, Minutes of Public Meeting, N.H. SUP. CT. (Sept. 7, 2018), 
https://www.courts.state.nh.us/committees/adviscommrules/sept-7-2018m.pdf. 
 45. PA. BAR ASS’N, WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION COMM’N, AMENDED RECOMMENDATION 
AND REPORT 2, https://www.christianlegalsociety.org/sites/default/files/site_files/ 
PA%20WIP%20Proposal.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2019). 
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invited comments on the proposed amendment to Pennsylvania Rule of 
Professional Conduct (RPC) 8.4 relating to misconduct.46 The Board did not 
recommend adopting the rule “wholesale.”47  The Board recognized that, as 
drafted, Model Rule 8.4(g) is “susceptible to challenges related to constitutional 
rights of lawyers, such as freedom of speech, association and religion.” 48  
Therefore, the Board proposed the adoption of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) with 
several modifications.49  These changes are a step in the right direction, but do 
not cure its constitutional faults.  I wrote a letter in response to the modified 
rule.50 
“In the Practice of Law” 
 The Board recognized that the “broad scope of the language 
‘conduct related to the practice of law’” in the Model Rule could 
extend to “lawyers ‘participating in bar association, business or social 
activities in connection with the practice of law.’”  Specifically, the 
Board expressed “grave concerns that adoption of such language 
would unconstitutionally chill lawyers’ speech in forums disconnected 
from the provision of legal services.”  Therefore, the Board proposed 
an alternative: “‘in the practice of law’ as a more narrowly-tailored 
scope of prohibited conduct.”  The Board conclude[d] that private 
activities are not intended to be covered by this proposed rule 
amendment, since to do so would increase the likelihood of infringing 
on constitutional rights of lawyers.” 
 This modification is a positive development.  By narrowing the 
scope of Rule 8.4(g), the Board has expressly excluded speech that 
may arise in “conduct related to the practice of law,” such as “social 
activities.”  Yet, this modification still raises constitutional concerns.  
And these concerns were highlighted by the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra.  
NIFLA considered whether California could require certain medical 
facilities (both licensed and unlicensed) to display messages 
concerning the availability of public funding for abortions. 
 In recent years, several circuit courts of appeals have strictly 
regulated speech associated with a regulated profession—that is 
“professional speech”—when “it involves personalized services and 
                                                 
 46. Proposed Amendments to the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct Regarding 
Misconduct, PA. BULL. (May 19, 2018), https://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol48/48-
20/773.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2019). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Letter from Josh Blackman, Assoc. Professor, S. Tex. Coll. of L. Hous., to the 
Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court of Pa. (July 13, 2018), 
https://www.christianlegalsociety.org/sites/default/files/site_files/Letter-Pennsylvania-
Blackman.pdf. 
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requires a professional license from the State.”  However, such a 
regime, the Supreme Court explained, “gives the States unfettered 
power to reduce a group’s First Amendment rights by simply imposing 
a licensing requirement.”  The Court expressed caution with applying 
laxer scrutiny to so-called “professional speech,” as that standard 
“would cover a wide array of individuals—doctors, lawyers, nurses, 
physical therapists, truck drivers, bartenders, barbers, and many 
others.”  Stated simply, the government lacks an “unfettered power” 
to regulate the speech of “lawyers,” simply because they provide 
“personalize[d] services” after receiving a “professional license.” 
 The Court identified two narrow exceptions to this rule, “neither of 
which turned on the fact that professionals were speaking.”  In the first 
circumstance, the Court has “applied more deferential review to some 
laws that require professionals to disclose factual, noncontroversial 
information in their ‘commercial speech.’”  This first condition is not 
relevant to the Proposed Amendments: Speech uttered “in the practice 
of law” does not “require professionals to disclose factual, 
noncontroversial information.” 
 Second, the Court noted that “[s]tates may regulate professional 
conduct, even though that conduct incidentally involves speech.”  This 
standard is directly relevant to the proposed rule: the state can 
“regulate professional conduct . . . that . . . incidentally involves 
speech,” but it cannot regulate speech that incidentally involves 
professional conduct.  The Proposed Amendment, by its own terms, 
straddles that line.  It applies to both “conduct” “in the practice of law” 
and “words” (that is speech) “in the practice of law.”  If the Board 
struck the phrase “words,” and focused solely on “conduct” “in the 
practice of law,” the Proposed Rule would potentially fall within the 
second exception identified in NIFLA.  But as drafted, the regulation 
of “words” would be subject to traditional strict scrutiny. 
 Given that this Proposed Rule is subject to strict scrutiny, members 
of the Bar would be faced with a notoriously vague standard: 
[s]pecifically, what “words” are “in the practice of law?”  The Bulletin 
explains, “Pennsylvania RPC and the Pennsylvania Rules of 
Disciplinary Enforcement do not define what constitutes the practice 
of law.”  Rather, “the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has explained 
what specific activities constitute the practice of law on a case-by-case 
basis.”  Relying on a “case-by-case” regime is the very sort of ad hoc 
standard that cannot meet strict scrutiny under the First Amendment. 
In light of NIFLA, a content-based restriction applied to “words” “in 
the practice of law” cannot satisfy the rigorous requirements of strict 
scrutiny.  This rule could possibly be cured by limiting its reach to 
“conduct in the practice of law” (that is, excluding mere “words”).  A 
more precise fix would limit the Rule’s reach to “conduct in the 
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representation of a client.”  This approach, which has been adopted in 
other jurisdictions, would further shrink the nexus between the 
conduct at issue, and the scope of the Bar’s jurisdiction.  Both of these 
standards would “regulate professional conduct, even though that 
conduct incidentally involves speech.”  They would not regulate 
speech, that incidentally involves “professional conduct.” 
“Bias, Prejudice, and Harassment” 
 Pennsylvania’s proposed rule does not define the terms bias, 
prejudice, and harassment.  Indeed, it defines those terms by repeating 
those terms: “in the practice of law, by words or conduct, knowingly 
manifest bias or prejudice, or engage in harassment, including but not 
limited to bias, prejudice, or harassment.”  There is no way for a 
member of the Bar, to know, in advance, whether his or her speech 
manifests “bias,” “prejudice,” or “harassment,” since those terms are 
not defined in the rule itself.  Proposed comment three offers 
“examples of manifestations of bias or prejudice,” but notes that the 
list is not comprehensive.  (Indeed, several of the items listed, such as 
“demeaning nicknames” and “attempted humor based on stereotypes” 
would be expressly protected by the First Amendment.)  Proposed 
comment four defines harassment as “verbal or physical conduct that 
denigrates or shows hostility or aversion toward a person on bases 
such as race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, 
age, sexual orientation, marital status, socioeconomic status, or 
political affiliation.”  The comment provides no guidance of what 
renders “[v]erbal” “conduct,” that is speech, “denigrat[ing]” or 
“show[ing] hostility or aversion.”  Given that this rule, as interpreted 
by the comments, is regulating not only “professional conduct,” but 
also “words,” this content-based restriction would fail the void-for-
vagueness standard. 
“Knowingly Manifest Bias or Prejudice” 
 ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) applies to those who “engage in conduct 
that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is harassment.”  The 
proposed Amendment applies a more stringent mens rea standard: one 
who “knowingly manifest[s] bias or prejudice, or engage[s] in 
harassment.”  This is a positive development, and would exclude 
situations where the subjective feelings of a listener may result in an 
ethics violation.  The misconduct must be knowing, and deliberate.  
However, this change does not cure the Proposed Amendment’s other 
constitutional faults discussed supra.51 
                                                 
 51. Id. 
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1. Status 
In May 2018, the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
rejected the rule: “[f]ollowing extensive review and discussion of the numerous 
comments,” it had “determined not to move forward with the proposed 
amendments, and renewed its study of the issue.”52  The Board proposed a new 
version of the rule in June 2018.53  It is currently under consideration. 
F. Tennessee 
In November 2017, the Board of Professional Responsibility of the Tennessee 
Supreme Court and the Tennessee Bar Association petitioned the Tennessee 
Supreme Court to adopt Rule 8.4(g) with several modifications. 54   The 
Tennessee Attorney General concluded that the rule was unconstitutional.55  I 
also submitted a letter, and applauded three additions to the rule.56 
First, the proposed comment [4] offers a definition of the phrase 
“legitimate advocacy” for the proposed RPC 8.4(g): 
Legitimate advocacy protected by Section (g) includes 
advocacy in any conduct related to the practice of the law, 
including circumstances where a lawyer is not representing 
a client and outside traditional settings where a lawyer acts 
as an advocate, such as litigation. 
This comment could be improved by providing some context of what 
those non-traditional settings are.  This sentence, which I suggest in 
my article, would suffice: “For example, this Rule does not apply to 
speech on matters of public concern at bar association functions, 
continuing legal education classes, law school classes, and other 
similar forums.’”  This addition would clarify that an attorney’s 
speech in the context of a lecture, debate, or CLE class, on a matter of 
public concern, would not amount to disciplinable conduct. 
 Second, proposed comment [4a] includes additional protections for 
free speech.  It provides: 
[4a] Section (g) does not restrict any speech or conduct not 
related to the practice of law, including speech or conduct 
protected by the First Amendment.  Thus, a lawyer’s speech 
                                                 
 52. PA. BULL., supra note 45. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Order, In re Petition for the Adoption of a New Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, RPC 8.4(g), (Tenn. 
Apr. 23, 2018) (No. ADM2017-02244), https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/ 
order_denying_8.4g_petition_.pdf [https://perma.cc/6HBN-7TAA] [hereinafter Tenn. Order]. 
 55. Tenn. Att’y Gen., supra note 25, at 9. 
 56. Letter from Josh Blackman, Assoc. Professor, S. Tex. Coll. of L. Hous., to Hon. James 
Hivner, Supreme Court of Tenn. (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/ 
6_blackman_cmt_to_tenn_sup_ct.pdf. 
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or conduct unrelated to the practice of law cannot violate 
this Section. 
I also applaud this addition.  It could be improved even further by 
replacing the first sentence with one used in an earlier draft of ABA 
Model Rule 8.4(g) from 2015, but was ultimately removed (see pp. 
248–49 of my article).  The comment provides: “This Rule does not 
apply to conduct protected by the First Amendment, as a lawyer does 
retain a ‘private sphere’ where personal opinion, freedom of 
association, religious expression, and political speech is protected by 
the First Amendment and not subject to this rule.”  Making this change 
would clarify that not only are values of free speech protected, but also 
those of freedom of association, as well as freedom of exercise. 
 Third, proposed comment [5b] excludes a provision that was 
included in ABA Model Rule 8.4(g): 
A lawyer may charge and collect reasonable fees and 
expenses for a representation.  Rule 1.5(a). 
Rather, comment [5d] expands on this sentiment by clarifying that 
charging fees does not amount to discrimination on the basis of 
socioeconomic status: 
Nevertheless, a lawyer does not engage in conduct that 
harasses or discriminates based on socioeconomic status 
merely by charging and collecting reasonable fees and 
expenses for a representation. 
I applaud this addition, which retains the right of an attorney to set 
“reasonable fees,” without fear of a bar complaint.57 
The Tennessee Bar adopted several of my comments verbatim and proposed 
a revised rule.58  Bloomberg BNA observed, “[t]hose revisions focused on trying 
to avoid confusion and clarify the legitimate advocacy exception and that the 
                                                 
 57. Id. 
 58. Comment of the Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee 
and the Tennessee Bar Association, In re Petition for the Adoption of a New Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, 
RPC 8.4(g), No. ADM2017-02244 (Tenn. Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.christianlegalsociety.org/ 
sites/default/files/site_files/TBA%20and%20BPR%20Comment%20Amending%20Proposed%20
Language%2003-21-2018.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2019).  The Board of Professional 
Responsibility and the Tennessee Bar Association: 
amend[ed] their joint proposed language for a new Rule 8.4(g) in response to, and to 
accommodate a number of, the constructive suggestions for the improvement of the 
proposed Rule made by Professor Josh Blackman of the South Texas College of Law and 
the Knoxville Bar Association.  Professor Blackman’s comments, filed by email on 
December 11, 2017, included praise for certain aspects of Petitioner’s modifications of 
the ABA Model Rule and several specific suggestions for further improvement. 
Id. 
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rule does not apply to conduct protected by the First Amendment.”59  In April 
2018, the Tennessee Supreme Court rejected the petition.60 
IV. STATES THAT CONSIDERED MODEL RULE 8.4(G) AS DRAFTED 
At least four states considered ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) without any 
modifications. 
A. Vermont 
Vermont was the first, and so far, only state to adopt ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) 
as drafted.61  It did so in 2017, quietly and “without discernable opposition.”62  
Indeed, in one important regard, the Vermont Supreme Court “made the rule’s 
restrictions on lawyers even greater.”63  The ABA’s proposed rule does not 
apply to a decision to make an otherwise discretionary withdrawal from a 
representation.  However, Vermont’s rule provides that “[t]he optional grounds 
for withdrawal set out in Rule 1.16(b) must also be understood in light of Rule 
8.4(g).  They cannot be based on discriminatory or harassing intent without 
violating that rule.”64  In other words, it would be misconduct for an attorney to 
withdraw from a representation, if doing so would violate Rule 8.4(g).  Vermont 
is very much an outlier. 
B. Arizona 
In February 2017, the Central Arizona Chapter of the National Lawyers Guild 
petitioned the Arizona Supreme Court to adopt ABA Model Rule 8.4(g).65  I 
                                                 
 59. Mindy Rattan, Tennessee Again Rejects Anti-Discrimination Ethics Rule, BLOOMBERG 
BNA (May 1, 2018), https://www.bna.com/tennessee-again-rejects-n57982091727/. 
 60. Tenn. Order, supra note 53. 
 61. Order Promulgating Amendments to the Vermont Rules of Professional Conduct (Vt. July 
14, 2017), https://www20.vermontjudiciary.org/sites/default/files/documents/ 
PROMULGATEDVRPrP8.4(g).pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8AU-8KHU]. 
 62. Andrew Strickler, Vermont’s Anti-Bias Rule Vote an Outlier in Heated Debate, LAW 360 
(Aug. 14, 2017, 9:30 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/953530/vermont-s-anti-bias-rule-
vote-an- outlier-in-heated-debate [https://perma.cc/LRK9-93WD] (last visited Feb. 27, 2019). 
 63. Michael S. McGinniss, Expressing Conscience with Candor: Saint Thomas More and 
First Freedoms in the Legal Profession, 42 HARV. J. OF L. & PUB. POL’Y 173, 213 n.165 (2019). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Petition by National Lawyers Guild of Central Arizona, In re Petition to Amend ER 8.4, 
Rule 42, Arizona Rules of the Supreme Court (Ariz. Feb. 3, 2017) (No. R-17-0032), 
https://www.christianlegalsociety.org/sites/default/files/site_files/2017%20National%20Lawyer%
20Guild%20Petition%20to%20Amend%20Rule%208.4(g)[1].pdf. 
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submitted a letter opposing the petition.66  That petition was denied on August 
27, 2018.67 
C. Nevada 
In May 2017, The Board of Governors of the State Bar of Nevada petitioned 
the Supreme Court of Nevada to amend its Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4 to 
include the ABA’s Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(g).68  In June 2017, 
I submitted a letter opposing the proposed rule.69  In September 2017, the Board 
of Governors of the State Bar withdrew the petition.70 
D. Montana 
The Montana Supreme Court accepted comments on Rule 8.4(g) through 
April 2017.71  The Montana Legislature passed a joint resolution opposing the 
constitutionality of Rule 8.4(g).72  To date, the Montana Supreme Court has 
taken no action on the rule. 
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